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The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell: Origins and Development is 
rather narrower in its topic than its title might suggest. It is really a book exclu- 
sively about Russell's logicism. But even within that topic Rodriguez-Consuegra 
focuses primarily on a short period around the turn of the century when Russell's 
logicist project was born, the period between 1900 (when Russell discovered 
Peano) and 1903 (when The Principles of Mathematics was published), rather than 
the more frequently studied period from 1903 to 1910-1913 (when Principia 
Mathematica was published). There is a detailed and important discussion of 
Russell's first contribution to Peano's logic, "Sur la logique des relations" 
(1901), and Chapter 4 is devoted to The Principles of Mathematics. Rodriquez- 
Consuegra lso gives due prominence to a popular essay of Russell's, "Recent 
Work on the Principles of Mathematics," also written in 1901. Russell tended to 
disparage it, but Rodriguez-Consuegra describes it (quite correctly) as a logicist 
manifesto (p. 139). The only significant references to Principia Mathematica oc- 
cur in Chapter 4, where, for a handful of topics (the definition of cardinal, ordinal, 
and real numbers, and the concepts of quantity and order), Rodriguez-Consuegra 
extends his account of how they were handled in the Principles to include a brief 
sketch of their treatment in Principia. 
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In comparison with most books on Russell's philosophy of mathematics this is 
an odd division of labour, and it is made odder by Rodriguez-Consuegra's decision 
to concentrate almost all his attention on the way Russell, as a logicist, handled 
the definition of mathematical concepts in terms of logical ones. The final chapter 
is devoted almost entirely to Russell's treatment of definitions, and the same topic 
occupies agood part of Chapter 4 as well. Rodriguez-Consuegra's main concern is 
with definitions by abstraction and their replacement by what he calls "construc- 
tive definitions," in which a complex is defined by means of its constituents, 
which are not only simpler than the original complex but ontologically more 
fundamental s well. Rodriguez-Consuegra regards the use of constructive defini- 
tions as the hallmark of Russell's mature logicism, "the true essence of Russell's 
method" (p. 205). 
As a result, however, little attention is paid to Russell's choice of logical axioms 
for his system. Yet this last was of paramount importance, for Russell's logicism 
was shaped primarily by the need to devise a logic which was both paradox-free 
and sufficiently powerful to permit the derivation of the whole of (classical) pure 
mathematics, including Cantor's transfinite arithmetic. The difficulties inherent 
in meeting both these requirements led to serious problems with some of the 
axioms--notably the Axiom of Infinity, the Multiplicative Axiom, and (most 
notoriously) the Axiom of Reducibility. Reluctantly, under the pressure of avoid- 
ing the paradoxes, Russell gave up his original vision of logic as the science of 
absolute generality, in favour of the type-restricted categorial logic of his mature 
logicism. In the process, the absolutely unrestricted variables of the Principles 
gave way to the restricted omains of quantification of Principia. Moreover, the 
account in the Principles of logical truths as those truths which would remain true 
under any substitution for any of their terms (apart from logical constants) was 
abandoned, with no clear, viable alternative ver emerging from Russell's pen. 
Rodriguez-Consuegra h s little to say about any of these issues, and it is odd to 
find them so completely neglected in a book on Russell's logicism. 
This somewhat skewed account of Russell's mathematical philosophy does 
have its compensations, however. It is good, for example, to have a serious 
account of Russell's 1901 paper on the logic of relations, which takes us well 
beyond the usual platitudes accorded the work. Although Rodriguez-Consuegra is 
mainly concerned with the period 1900-1903, he does devote Chapter 2 to Rus- 
sell's little known writings on the philosophy of mathematics in the 1890s. For this 
chapter, as elsewhere in the volume, Rodriguez-Consuegra makes good use of 
Russell's unpublished papers (including both the English and French manuscripts 
for "Sur la logique des relations," which he shows have some important variants 
on the published article). Since he does not cover the difficult transition from the 
Principles of Mathematics toPrincipia Mathematica, however, he mostly ignores 
the manuscripts which were written after 1903. Last but not least, Rodriguez- 
Consuegra demonstrates an amazingly wide knowledge of the authors who pre- 
ceded and influenced Russell. He has, it seems, read just about everything of 
relevance that Russell read. For these reasons, his book contains much important 
information that has not appeared elsewhere. 
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The best and most valuable chapter is the third, which is devoted to Peano and 
his school. Despite the efforts of H. C. Kennedy (see especially his [1973] and 
[1980]), the work of Peano is still little studied in the English-speaking world, and 
that of the other members of his school even less so. Rodriguez-Consuegra's third 
chapter, which ranges widely over Peano's work and more briefly over that of 
Burali-Forti, Padoa, and Pieri, is the best succinct summary of the school's 
achievements in mathematical logic that I know of. 
Rodriguez-Consuegra's close attention to Peano pays off in his discussion of 
Russell's "Sur la logique des relations," for he is able to demonstrate how close 
Peano (and Pieri and Burali-Forti, too) came to the famous definition of cardinal 
numbers which Russell first published in his 1901 paper. Rodriguez-Consuegra 
goes further, and claims that Russell got the definition from Peano without ac- 
knowledging the fact. This I find hard to credit. Russell was remarkably untouchy 
about matters of priority and, in this case, the real priority goes by many years to 
Frege who published the definition in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884). Rus- 
sell, we know, did not study Frege until 1902, and he did claim independent 
discovery of the definition. On this I am inclined to believe him and find it quite 
conceivable that both Peano and Russell rediscovered the definition indepen- 
dently around the same time, or even that Peano, who did not claim independent 
discovery, got it from Russell. In any case, Peano's attitude to the definition is 
problematic in view of the lack of any clear foundational approach in his work. 
Nonetheless, Rodriguez-Consuegra presents information for the first time that 
every subsequent historian of the definition will have to take seriously. 
The first chapter of Rodriguez-Consuegra's book is devoted to a survey of what 
he calls "the background to logicism," including Boole, Peirce, Schr6der, Mc- 
Coll, Dedekind, Cantor, Couturat, and Whitehead. As can be seen from this list of 
names, he throws his net widely and, to my mind, too indiscriminately. It seems to 
be assumed that any step toward abstraction (p. 117) or logical rigor in mathemat- 
ics (p. 185) was a step toward logicism. Thus, positions are included (under the 
guise of a "fusion doctrine") that "resemble logicism only in the sense that . . .  
[they do] not state a clean, sharp distinction between logic and mathematics" (p. 
9). This is then taken to include those views which, after Boole, saw logic as a 
branch of mathematics. But most of these were not only not logicism but incom- 
patible with it, amounting to the mathematicization f logic rather than the logici- 
zation of mathematics. Such necessary qualifications, however, tend to get lost in 
Rodriguez-Consuegra's pursuit of early logicists. Thus, we have references to 
"Couturat's logicism" (p. 21), Dedekind's "logicist tendencies" (p. 10), the "im- 
plicit . . . logicism" of Whitehead's Universal Algebra, and even "[G.E.] 
Moore's and Peano's "logicism" (p. 90). There are also references to the "incipi- 
ent logicism" of Russell's Essay on the Foundations of Geometry (p. 42) and to 
the "logicist connotations" of some of Russell's unpublished manuscript before 
1900 (p. 62). 
As for full-fledged logicism itself, Rodriguez-Consuegra cl ims (p. 128) that 
Russell got it from Pieri's "Geometria di posizione" (1898). This is almost cer- 
tainly wrong. Although Russell received an offprint of this paper in 1898, there is 
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clear evidence that he did not read it until August 1900, after he had adopted 
logicism [Russell 1983, 363]. Rodriguez-Consuegra suggests that Russell must 
have read it earlier in order to explain the dramatic hange in his treatment of 
projective geometry in his 1899 reply to Poincar6 [Russell 1989]. This, of course, 
supposes that Russell was incapable of thinking of anything new for himself. In 
fact, however, Russell's attempted axiomatization f projective geometry in 1899 
is not logicist but formalist. Moreover, its exceptionally stark formalism (more 
austere than Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899), which Russell did not 
read until early 1901) was mainly influenced by the role of duality principles in 
projective geometry itself. Indeed, it is hard to detect the influence of other 
authors on Russell's highly idiosyncratic treatment--though Scott [1894], which 
Russell was reading about the time he wrote the reply to Poincar6, was perhaps 
the most important on account of its heavy emphasis on duality. 
These criticisms illustrate the most peculiar flaw in Rodriguez-Consuegra's 
book. In a strange way, Russell seems quite external to the book. There is no 
coherent account of the intellectual project hat Russell was engaged in that led 
up to Principia Mathematica. In its place, we get (as already suggested in the case 
of logicism) a melange of influences and supposed influences. It seems as if Rodri- 
guez-Consuegra h s ransacked the literature prior to Russell looking for any 
remarks that bear even a remote similarity to positions Russell took up. This work 
is done so thoroughly that, by the time it is complete, it seems as though Russell 
himself has contributed nothing at all. Moore, we are told, supplied the philoso- 
phy, Cantor the set theory and transfinite arithmetic, and Peano the logic. From 
Rodriguez-Consuegra's account one would think that Russell was merely knocked 
from one position to another by these conflicting influences, like a molecule in the 
kinetic theory of gases. What is missing, to continue the analogy, is Maxwell's 
sorting demon--that is, an intelligence that shaped, directed, and combined the 
influences to its own ends. 
The Mathematical Philosophy of Bertrand Russell: Origins and Development is 
a revised English version of part of Rodriguez-Consuegra's massive doctoral 
thesis "El Metodo en la Filosofia de Bertrand Russell" (Barcelona, 1987) pre- 
pared by the author himself. His publishers, unfortunately, have not served the 
book well in that they did not employ a good English-language editor for the book. 
Rodriguez-Consuegra's English is not idiomatic, and at times it is difficult o grasp 
what he wants to say. This is a pity, since the book contains much that is worth 
bringing to the attention of Russell scholars. 
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Most of us are familiar with the scenerio used in some elementary mathematics 
books to describe the origins of counting. In order to keep track of his animals, a
primeval herder assembles a pile of pebbles, one stone for each animal under his 
care. When in doubt as to the size of the herd, the keeper employs a 1 : 1 corre- 
spondence with the animals and his collection of pebbles; thus, the 1 : 1 correspon- 
dence is established as the basis for counting. Later, this same herder, or possibly 
his descendant, may rely on the use of tally marks cut into a piece of bone or wood 
for the same purpose. Eventually groups of such tally marks are abbreviated by 
code symbols, and numerals are born--graphic symbols to represent number 
concepts. The story is simple, appeals to intuition, and is supported by some 
historical evidence. But perhaps this story is too simple. There are many missing 
links, questions left unanswered, about the development of counting and the 
evolution of numerals. "How long were concrete counters such as pebbles 
used? . . . .  Were they employed in a more systematic manner? . . . .  Did the use of 
concrete counters evolve into more sophisticated mathematical recording tech- 
niques? . . . .  If so, when and where?" In From Counting to Cuneiform, Denise 
Schmandt-Besserat, an art historian, and professor of Middle Eastern Studies at 
the University of Texas at Austin, attempts to answer such questions and, in the 
process, develops a fascinating theory that a system of concrete counting fore- 
shadowed the rise of abstract counting and, eventually, resulted in the develop- 
ment of writing. 
In 1969, Schmandt-Besserat eceived funding to study the prehistoric use of 
clay in the Near East. She travelled to various archaeological collections examin- 
ing clay objects produced in the period 8000 to 6000 B.c. A variety of prepottery 
objects were in evidence; however, a particular, unexpected artifact appeared in 
abundance. It was a small, manufactured, geometric-shaped object, a "token." 
The geographical origins of these tokens varied widely: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, 
and Israel. Their omnipresence and abundance indicated ausefulness and impor- 
tance, but what was their purpose? The recognition of such objects was not new; 
